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HARRY W. VANNEMAN*
An express trust is a substantive law institution.' A construc-
tive trust is a remedial device of the court of equity: "the for-
mula," said Judge Cardozo, "through which the conscience of
equity finds expression, when property has been acquired in such
circumstances that the holder of the legal title may not in good
conscience retain the beneficial interest, equity converts him into
a trustee.... A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust
is bound by no unyielding formula. The equity of the transac-
tion must shape the measure of relief."' In another leading case
Cardozo, J., said it was "a remedial device through which pref-
erence of self is made subordinate to loyalty to others."3 The
technique by which the chancellor usually enforced his decrees,
by direct command to the defendant, thus putting pressure upon
him, provides an effective remedy in many situations. This
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1 Pound, "The Progress of the Law, Equity' 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420
(1920).
!-Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., zz 5 N.Y. 380, 322 N.E. 378
(1919); Newton v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399 (1877).
Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 467, 364 N.E. 545, 6z A.L.R. i
(3928) ; 3 Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, sec. 473 (I935). See dissent of Wil-
liams, J. in Oleff v. Hodapp, IZ9 Ohio St. 43z, at p. 444, 195 N.E. 838
(1935) where these definitions are approved. American Law Institute, Re-
statement of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, Proposed Final Draft, Pt. II,
sec. i6o "Where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable
duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched
if he were permitted to retain it, a constructive trust arises."
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direct technique in personam is the method used in the con-
structive trust. It is very often adopted in reformation cases,
in actions for specific performance, in actions to defeat fraudu-
lent conveyances, and to affect restoration of property, and
"sometimes to develop a new field of equitable interposition,"
for example, "specific restitution of received benefits in order to
prevent unjust enrichment.'" It is obvious that this is a reme-
dial technique and in no sense a substantive law matter. When
the holder of the title to property is declared to be a construc-
tive trustee the court of equity is not in the least interested
to create a trust in the sense as is the settlor in an express trust.
On the contrary, the court is preparing the way for an imme-
diate termination of an existing situation, a transfer of the
property involved to the one found to be best entitled thereto.
If time is required, the situation is treated as though an express
trust had existed from the time of the wrongdoing of the
defendant. Usually, however, the result is an order for an
immediate conveyance.' In a jurisdictional sense no doubt can
exist in respect to the chancellor's power to utilize this remedy,
whether it ought to be exercised in a particular instance is, and
should always be, a matter within the sound discretion of the
chancellor. Being remedial it must be kept highly flexible and
only resorted to in the interest of that quality of justice admin-
istered by the equity court.
Dean Pound has pointed out that sometimes courts seem
to reach unfortunate results because of an apparent confusion
of thought as to what the nature of a constructive trust really
is. In several distinct groups of cases in Ohio it seems that full
and effective use of this device has not been made, and it may
be that some such confusion as suggested by Dean Pound is
responsible for what seems to the writer to be unfortunate
results. It is proposed to examine these instances to discover
the reason, if possible, and to suggest the application of the
4 Pound op. cit., note i supra 421 and cases there cited.
- Bogert, op cit., note 3 supra, p. 1462.
6 Pound, op cit., note i supra.
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comparatively recent concept of the constructive trust in their
solution.
The time-honored classification of trusts into express trusts
and implied trusts, and the latter again into resulting and con-
structive trusts, which is so deeply imbedded in our trust law,
may in no small degree be responsible for the misconception.
Implicit in this classification is the concept that these three
classes, express, resulting, and constructive are all parts of the
larger whole, i.e., trusts in the substantive law sense. A very
much more scientific classification was developed by the late
Professor Costigan, in which the function of the different
classes is made the basis for classification, and, with respect to
constructive trusts, its use as a fraud and unjust enrichment
preventing remedial weapon is emphasized.
FORGED WILLS AND THEIR PROBATE
The first group of cases to be considered involve forged
wills and their probate. The Court of Appeals of this state
refused to make use of the constructive trust device in a fact
pattern which seemed strikingly suited to its application. In
the case of Pettit v. Morton,8 the plaintiff, in his complaint,
alleged that in the genuine will of the testator he was the
devisee of a valuable hotel property situated in Cleveland;
that the defendant, the son of the testator, by forgery and
fraud, secured the execution of a false will and thereafter, by
the collusion of the witnesses to the will, his sisters, the probate
of the same; that the defendant concealed the true will and
destroyed it in 1923, almost twenty years after the probate of
the false will; that the plaintiff discovered the fraud for the
first time in 1925. The trial court refused to impress a con-
structive trust upon the defendant with respect to the property;
7"The Classification of Trusts as Express, Resulting and Constructive."
27 Harv. L. Rev. 437 (1914). The old classification is retained-by Bogert in
his recent work. Bogert, op. cit., note 3 supra, vol. i, sec. i. It is abandoned
by the American Law Institute Restatement Trusts.
8 z8 Ohio App. 2z7, 162 N.E. 627 (i928). Noted in 3 Univ. of Cin.
L. Rev. 107, 14 Cornell L.Q. 1O8, 27 Mich. L. Rev. 452.
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this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, and the
Supreme Court overruled a motion to certify.! There was.no
dispute in any of these proceedings as to facts as the case came
before the courts upon demurrer.
Certain statutory provisions in this state precluded the
customary methods of redress. A one year statute of limita-
tions had barred any contest of the probate proceedings." The
court of equity is without any probate jurisdiction, exclusive
jurisdiction in such matters having been conferred upon the
probate court." Likewise it has no jurisdiction to set aside
probate proceedings. Being a court of record 2 its final judg-
ments are a verity and not subject to attack collaterally."
Furthermore, it is quite likely that the true will could not be
offered for probate, and, on denial thereof, an appeal taken
to the Common Pleas Court under G.C. 10532. That statute
provides for a review of the refusal of the Probate Court to
admit a will for probate and is not a device for the review of a
proceeding already had, which in all probability such a strategy
would be considered to be. Similarly the Probate Court would
almost certainly refuse to set aside its own action at this late
date.' 4
There were two possible avenues for redress open to the
plaintiff. In this case he first chose the equitable one as above
stated. Sullivan, P. J., forecast his conclusion in the way he pre-
sented the question of the case: "Thus the vital question is
whether a court of equity, under an unprobated will, can declare
a trust on the ground of fraud, and in that manner ultimately
9 z8 Ohio App. 44.
10 Ohio G.C. 10531 ("If, within one year after probate had, no person
interested appears and contests the validity of the will, the probate shall be
forever binding, saving, however, to infants, and persons of unsound mind, or
in captivity, the like period after the respective disabilities are removed.")
This section now changed by G.C. 10504-3z reduces the time to six months.
"Ohio G.C. 1o492, 10501-53.
12 Ohio Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 7.
13 Joseph Hunter's Will, 6 Ohio 500 (1834). Lessee of Swasey's Heirs v.
Blackman, 8 Ohio 5 (1837); Morningstar v. Selby, 15 Ohio 345, 45 Am.
Dec. 579 (1846).
14 See 27 Mich. L. Rev. 452 (929).
THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN OHIO 5
have declared invalid the will in favor of the heirs at law, duly
probated under the statute. . . ."'5 So framed this proceeding
becomes a collateral attack upon the false will and its probate.
Even so stated the plaintiff's case is not entirely hopeless.
It is well settled that the court of equity has the power, in an
independent action, to impeach the judgments of a law court
where they are obtained by fraud and circumvention." It seems
that there is no controlling reason why the decisions of the
probate court should have a greater degree of sanctity or final-
ity than the proceedings of any other court. The fact that the
judgment of that court relates to a will by which the property
of the testator is directed to certain persons and that equity's
decree will change that devolution seems unimportant. An
attack upon the right of the fraudulent holder of the property
to keep that which he has secured by a fraud on both the testa-
tor and the Probate Court does not convert the equity proceed-
ing into a will contest.
The contrary position and theory, however, taken by
Jones, J., in his dissent in the case of Seeds v. Seeds, viz., that
the legislature, by its statutes, had adopted a policy which
"requires that the estates of deceased persons, being deprived
of a master and subject to all manner of claims, should at once
devolve to a new and competent ownership; ... and that the
result attained should be firm and perpetual,"1 is obviously
one of policy to be weighed against the other policy of fraud
prevention here urged. There is, moreover, considerable au-
1" Petit v. Morton, note 8, supra, p. 230.
""Seeds v. Seeds, 116 Ohio St. 144, I56 N.E. 193, 5z A.L.R. 761
(1927); MclItire v. Mclntire, 107 Ohio St. 5IO, 14o N.E. 328 (1923);
Darst v. Phillips, 41 Ohio St. 514 (i885); Coates v. Bank, 23 Ohio St. 415
(1872); Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio St. 485, 93 Am. Dec. 638 (1867).1 7 Ohio G.C. 10531 now 10504-32.
" Seeds v. Seeds, note I6, supra, p. 166. The opinion contains a quotation
from Broderick's TVill, 88 U.S. 503, 2z L.Ed. 599 (1894). (Bradley, J., in
his opinion in Broderick's Will, expressly recognized, however, that there were
circumstances so frequently fraudulent that the policy of prompt and final
settlement of estates might have to yield and one of them was admitted to be
procuring of probate fraudulently by collusion between executor and legatee.)
See Warren, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 309 (I9z8).
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thority for this view."9 Judge Jones insists that the adoption
by the Ohio legislature of a statute of limitations by which the
contest of a probate proceeding must be instituted within a year
and further providing that "the probate shall be forever bind-
ing" makes it impossible to invoke the principle of concurrent
jurisdiction without destroying the order of probate.
This position is predicated upon an interpretation of the
legislative policy manifested in a strongly worded statute of
limitations, upon a policy of stability and permanency of estate
settlements, and on the desirability of the preservation of jury
trials in will contest cases. Balanced against this is the policy
of getting the wrong to the plaintiff righted and of preventing
an impostor from reaping the fruits of his wrong.
Much can be said for either position. A court which desires
to place a high value upon the security and permanency of
estate settlements, may choose to turn a deaf ear to the occa-
sional just claims of a defrauded potential devisee. Other
courts, dreading more the possible danger of fraud and per-
jury, and less the apparent unsettling of estates finally probated,
may choose to make exceptions when gross fraud and forgery
have been the means whereby such settlement was secured.
This question was seemingly settled in Ohio, by the Seeds
case, by the choice of the latter policy. A decision of the Probate
Court in that case was subjected to the same scrutiny by the
equity court for fraud, as is the judgment of any other court.
There being then, according to this view, no manifested and
ultimately controlling policy of finality and respose with re-
spect to probate decrees, it is eminently fitting that the court
of equity should permit the plaintiff, who has been g-ossly
defrauded by the defendant, to utilize the remedial proL 'ss of
19S towe v. Stowe, 140 Mo. 594, 41 S.W. 951 (1897); California v.
McGlynn, 2o Cal. 233, 8i Am. Dec. II8 (I862); Del Campo v. Ct, zzarillo,
154 Cal. 647, 98 Pac. 1o59 (i9o8); Langdon v. Blackburn, io9 C 1. 19,
4I Pac. 8I4 (x895); Luther v. Luther, iz2 Ill. 558, 13 N.E. 166 ( ,127);
Bartlett v. Manor, 146 Ind. 6z1, 45 N.E. io6o (1897) ; Mosier v. Harmon,
29 Ohio St. 220 (1876) ; McVeigh. v. Fetterman, 95 Ohio St. 292, 1i6 N.E.
qI8 (1917) ; Bunce v. Galbraith, 268 Pa. 389, 112 AtI. i43 (1920).
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the constructive trust. Any person who holds the legal title to
property which he acquired by the practice of fraud and cir-
cumvention not only upon the testator, but upon the probate
court itself, which was induced to render a decree which would
never have been made had the facts been known, will be de-
clared by a court of equity to be a trustee of such property
for the benefit of the parties who have been defrauded." Thus
in the Seeds case a constructive trust was impressed upon a
defendant, who had secured the title to the property by means
of a forged will, which, had the forgery been known, would
have entirely defeated the probate of the will. The equity pro-
ceeding therefore, while seemingly a pretty direct attack upon
the probate decree precisely as in the Pettit case, was neverthe-
less not sufficient to deter the Supreme Court from imposing
the trust. Indeed such a situation has been held a clear case
for equitable intervention.2 In his recent work Professor Bo-
gert says: "To the writer it seems likely that the public interest
in expeditious and permanent settlement of estates can be ade-
quately protected from a construction of these acts which leaves
the door open for the action of equity when the probate court
has been induced to move to make its probate decree by the
misrepresentation and forgery of the proponent or another
person.
2
The facts in the Pettit case differ from those in the Seeds
case only in the matter of the relationship of the plaintiff, the
"I Seeds v. Seeds, note 16, supra, 158; Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio St. 484,
9. Am. Dec. 638 (1867); Barnesby v. Powell, I Vesey Sr. z84, 27 Eng. Rep.
1034 (2749); Broderick's Will, 88 U.S. 503, 22 L.Ed. 599 (1874); Grimes
v. Chew, 43 U.S. 619, 11 L.Ed. 402 (1844). ("One man possesses himself
wrongfully and fraudulently of the property of another; in equity, he holds
such property in trust, for the rightful owner.")
" Seeds v. Seeds, note I6, supra. See also, Tracy v. Muir, 15 1 Cal. 363,
90 Pac. 832 (2907); Rishel v. McPherson Co., 122 Kan. 741, 253 Pac. 586
(2927); Sohler v. Sohler, 235 Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282, 87 Am. St. Rep. 98
(29o2). See Del Campo v. Camarillo, 154 Cal. 647, 98 Pac. 1049. Cf.,
Patterson v. Dickinson, 193 Fed. 328 (1912); 31 Col. L.Rev. 1203 (2932);
Gemmel v. Fletcher, 76 Kan. 577, 92 Pac. 713 (2907); Winder v. Scholey,
83 Ohio St. 204, 93 N.E. 2089, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 995, 21 Ann. Cas. 1379
(I9IO).
" Bogert, op. cit., note 5, supra, p. 2483.
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devisee in the true will, to the testator. In the former he was
a stranger, in the latter he was an heir. It is not perceived how
this could make a legal difference. No court, adopting the view
that the statute secures no finality or repose in probate of estates
but that equity may scrutinize the decree for fraud as in any
other case, and impose a constructive trust, should discriminate
in favor of an heir.23 Yet the Court of Appeals in the Pettit
case disposes of the case on that ground, and on that ground
distinguishes the Seeds case. The plaintiff is denied equitable
relief, and an inquiry into the reason for refusing the exercise of
its dear jurisdictional power is cogent.
The reason assigned was that the plaintiff had no capacity
to sue, that he had no right on which to stand. This approach
seems to be from a substantive law standpoint. When a court
speaks of "rights" and "capacities," and, because of their ab-
sence, denies a remedy to a person who was defrauded by a
forger, guilty of the most reprehensible conduct by which one
could possibly obtain the title to property, by which not only the
testator, but the court itself, was defrauded, it seems dear that
the court of equity has turned conceptualist at the expense of
justice. The majority rule, with which Ohio agrees, is doubt-
less that an unprobated will passes no title to the devisee
therein.2" On the probate of the will the title ordinarily is con-
sidered to relate back to the death of the testator. This rule,
however, seems greatly overworked when it is declared with
respect to an unprobated will, that "it is a mere scrap of paper,
inert and lifeless, until it is clothed with the garment of the
23 See cases note zI, stpra.
24 Lessee of Swasey's Heirs v. Blackman, 8 Ohio 5 (1837); Brown v.
Burdick, 25 Ohio St. 26o (1874); Woodbridge v. Browning, 14 Ohio St.
328 (1863); Rockel, Complete Ohio Probate Practice ( 4 th ed. 1924) sec.
I6o8 N. 74; Page, Wills, (7d. ed. 1926) sec. 525, 527. Contra-A will
before probate proprio vigoro, vests the title to the realty devised in the
devisee simultaneously with the death of the testator and the probate is a mere
formality. Cole v. Seldon, 169 Ark. 695, 276 S.W. 993 (925); Norris v.
Norris, 32 Hun. 175 (N.Y. 1884); Cooley v. McElmeel, 149 N.Y. 228
(1896); 2 Page, Wills, (2d. ed. 1926) sec. 1386; Bethany Hospital Co. v.
Phillips, 8z Kan. 64, 107 Pac. 530 (191o); Brown v. Webster, 87 Neb. 780,
128 N.W. 638 (910).
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law. It is a mere carcass until infused with the blood of pro-
bate." This picturesque and figurative language does not state
the truth. The devisee in an unprobated will has some "inter-
est." He may contest the probate of another's will if he acts
within the statutory period.2" But to make such contest it has
been held that one must have "such a direct, pecuniary interest
in the estate of the putative testator, as would be impaired or
defeated by the will, or be benefited by setting it aside." The
devisee in an unprobated will has such an interest. Further-
more, as will appear presently, he had a cause of action at law.
In analogous situations, later discussed, the right to relief in
equity to defeat fraud has been accorded to persons whose
position seemed no stronger and whose interest was no greater,
than that of the devisee in an unprobated will. Thus, a devisee
in a will, who secures the testacy of the deceased by fraudulent
promise to hold for or convey to a stranger to the title, has been
declared trustee ex maleficio at the instance of the stranger."
Where the will does not disclose either the trust or the intended
beneficiaries and the named devisees orally promised to hold
for them, a constructive trust was imposed.2" A conveyance to
a grantee on his oral promise to hold for a stranger where the
grantee refused to carry out his promise, in some jurisdictions,
"Pettit v. Morton, note 8, supra, p. 232; Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra,
p. 1479. ("One court has taken the position here that C" (devisee in un-
probated will) "had no legal interest to enable him to get a constructive trust,
since the unprobated will was now worthless and a mere scrap of paper, and
hence that C could not obtain the help of equity, although possibly the heirs
and next of kin of the deceased might. This seems unsound. If A" (devisee
in forged will which was probated) "had not put forward his forged will, and
had not suppressed the genuine will, it is practically certain that C would have
offered the genuine will and have procured the aid of the court in getting the
property on the basis of that will. This degree of certainty is sufficient to show
that the defendants' wrong has been done to the plaintiff.")
"I Ohio G.C. 10531 now 10504-32.
"TChilcote v. Hoffman, 97 Ohio St. 98, 11i9 N.E. 364 (1918); Ken-
neldy's Exr. v. Wolcott, ix8 Ohio St. 443, 161 N.E. 336 (1928); Bloor v.
Plat, 78 Ohio St. 46, 84 N.E. 604 (1908).
"' McDowell v. McDowell, 141 Ia. 286, 119 N.W. 702 (1909); Smul-
lz v. Wharton, 73 Neb. 667, 103 N.W. 288 (19o5); Bogert, Trusts 135
(1921).
"' Gaines v. Chew, note 2o, supra; IWinder v. Scholey, note 21, supra.
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is redressed at the instance of the intended beneficiary by im-
posing a constructive trust upon the grantee." Similarly, the
court of equity imposed a trust upon the heir who took by
inheritance but suppressed the will by which the property was
given to the younger sons until the will was produced and pro-
bated. The younger sons had the right to sue." In the Seeds
case, Marshall, C. J., strongly states the doctrine thus, "A court
of equity will not permit any person standing in a fiduciary
situation, or who, from the relation in which he stands to an-
other, is capable of exercising an undue influence over his mind,
to derive a profit from any transaction which takes place during
the continuance of such fiduciary character in the one case, or
which may be supposed to have taken place by reason of such
opportunities of undue influence in the other."3 " It is submitted
that the court may have denied relief due to a misconception of
the constructive trust. It is seemingly considered a substantive
legal institution instead of a remedial device.3
The subsequent history of the litigation will perhaps make
this point dearer. On being denied a review by the Supreme
Court of Ohio the plaintiff instituted a law action for damages,
his second possibility for redress. This case also came before the
Court of Appeals, on a ruling on demurrer, thereby raising no
question of fact.3 It is obvious that this action is founded on
the same fraudulent conduct of the defendant, and, being
brought within four years of his discovery of the wrong, it was
within the time prescribed by the statute of limitations appli-
cable in such cases.35
It may be noted parenthetically that there was a more ob-
30 Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra, p. 1478. Also see sections 495 and 496,
and cases cited therein.
"
1Hampden v. Hampden, 3 Bro. P.C. 550, 1 Eng. Rep. 1492 (1709).
32 (Italics Mine). Seeds v. Seeds, note 16, supra, quoting Long v. White,
17 Ohio St. 484 at 509. See 14 Cornell L.Q. 1o8 (1928).
" See 48 Harv. L.Rev. 986 (1935); 27 Mich. L.Rev. 45? (1929); 30
Mich. L. Rev. 478 (1932); 3 Cinn. L. Rev. 107 (1929); I4 Cornell L.Q.
to8 (1928); 31 Col. L.Q. I20o3 (1931).
"
4Pettit v. Morton, 38 Ohio App. 348, 176 N.E. 494 (1930)-
11 Ohio G.C. 11224 (3).
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vious tort remedy, rarely used however, provided by statute
against one who "intentionally conceals or withholds it (a will)
or neglects or refuses to produce it for probate .... He shall
be liable to the action of any party aggrieved for the damages
sustained by such neglect or refusal."36
The court, pointing out that there was no equitable relief
for the plaintiff, and confessing to a belief that he had been
grossly wronged declared: "We take the broad view that upon
the principle of justice there is no wrong without a remedy,
unless it be inhibited by statute or well defined public policy,"
and this broad policy is discovered in the Ohio constitution,"
which provides, "All courts shall be open and every person, for
an injury done to his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice ad-
ministered without denial or delay." Examining the plaintiff's
position it was decided that an unprobated will was not a "mere
nullity," and it afforded a basis for a cause of action in tort.
Hence the law court is more sensitive to fraud than the court of
equity. The court is clear that this cause of action at law, be-
ing remedial, did not attack the probate proceedings. Why, it
may be asked, if this be true, was the remedial process of equity,
the constructive trust, an attack on the probate proceedings?
It is insisted by the court that in the law action a judgment for
damages results and it in no way disturbs the property in de-
fendant's hands, even though the measure of damages is the
value of the property." The opinion states, however, "It is
this fact that distinguishes the case at bar from the earlier case
in equity between the same parties already referred to." Is
1 Ohio G.C. 10514 nlOw 10504-13. See 48 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (i935);
Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 6o8 (i916); Creek v. Lasky, 248 Mich. 425
(i929). See also, 30 Col. L. Rev. 409, 14 Minn. L. Rev. 704.
W Ohio Constitution, Art. I, sec. 16.
38 Pettit v. Morton, note 34, supra, p. 355. See, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 986
(1935). Creek v. Laski, 248 Mich. 4z5, 227 N.W. 817 (1929); Dulin v.
Bailey, 172 N.C. 608, 9 S.E. 689 (i916); Taylor v. Bennett, i Ohio C.C.
95 (1885); Lewis v. Corbin, 185 Mass. 520, 81 N.E. 248 (1907). Cf.
Hall v. Hall, 91 Conn. 514, oo At. 441 (1917); Hutchins v. Hutchins,
7 Hill (N.Y.) 104 (1845).
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not the court again considering the constructive trust as a sub-
stantive institution, one in which a plaintiff to succeed must have
a property interest to stand upon? In fact it is merely a reme-
dial device of the court of equity by which this defendant is
told that although you have the title to the hotel property,
because of the means used to secure it, we consider it inequitable
that you should retain it and from this point on you are trustee
of it for the one injured by your fraud. It is believed that this
is in no sense an attack upon the probate of the forged will. The
case at law was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 9
In the Seeds case Marshall, C. J., very clearly states the
true view: "This controversy can be disposed of on broad prin-
ciples of chancery jurisprudence, without disturbing the will or
its probate or the subsequent proceedings for transfer of legal
title." Furthermore, it is submitted that this is a situation which
requires the specific relief available only in equity.4"
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS AND THE WILLS ACT
There is no requirement of a writing in the Ohio Statute
of Frauds4 for the creation of an express trust, with the result
3 9 Morton v. Pettit, xz. Ohio St. 241, 177 N.E. 581 (1930). The fol-
lowing comments on this series of cases all declare that the const. trust should
have been allowed. See note 33, supra. "It would seem that a dearer case
could not have been found for the application of the principles that equity will
not permit a statute to be used as an instrument for fraud." Quoted from
27 Mich. L. Rev. 452 (1929).
40Dulin v. Bailey, 172 N.C. 6o8, 90 S.E. 689 (1956); 3 Cin. L. Rev.
107 (9z9). ("Equity should assume jurisdiction at the request of one
obviously defrauded who has no adequate remedy at law, particularly where
there has been fraud upon the court and the intention of a testator has been
intercepted by one guilty of violating several penal statutes.")
See Dye v. Parker, 1o8 Kan. 304 (1921). The case refused relief of
reformation asked for obvious reasons, but the judge said in his opinion, "If
the petition had alleged that the person who profited by the deceit practiced
upon the testator had been a party to its perpetration, a remedy could doubt-
less be provided by impressing a trust upon the property acquired through the
fraud in the hands of the beneficiary."
4 Besides Ohio the following states have no appreciable statute of frauds:
Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Mexico, North
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyom-
ing. See Scott, Cases on Trusts, (2d.) ed. 143 (1931); I Bogert, op. cit.,
note 3, supra, sec. 64.
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that our courts have escaped a most prolific and bothersome
series of questions in which the constructive trust has played a
considerable role. These cases fall into one or the other of two
fact patterns: (I) A conveys land to B, who pays no considera-
tion and who orally agrees to hold for and reconvey to A; (2)
A conveys land to B, who pays no consideration and B orally
agrees to hold for and convey to C. In England," and by some
decisions in the United States," in cases of the first type, the
rule is established that specific restoration will be made for A,
or his estate, because "it is not honest for him (B) to keep."44
The decided weight of authority in the country is contra, how-
ever, on the theory that to allow restoration is to enforce the
oral trust contra to the statute of frauds, and B is allowed to
keep the property." This majority view is, so unfortunate and
affords a result so undesirable that it has met with severe criti-
cism,4 ' and the courts themselves have loaded it with many
exceptions or avenues of escape. In the second fact pattern
if B were guilty of actual fraud at the time of making the oral
promise, all agree that a constructive trust may be imposed upon
him at the instance of C and for his benefit. But for the actual
fraud of B, C in all probability would have received the prop-
erty directly from A. C is then a defrauded party and equity
can give specific reparation for the tort by putting the parties
"Davies v. Otty, 35 Beav. zo8 (1865).
43 See Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra, sec. 495, P- 1587-
44 Davis v. Otty, note 42, supra.
-1 See Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra, p. 1591, for a list of cases, and Scott,
"Conveyances not Properly Declared." 37 Harv. L. Rev. 652, 658 n. 23
(1924). A leading case, Titcomb v. Morrill, io Allen (Mass.) 15 (1865)
was decided the same year as Davies v. Otty.
" Ames, "Constructive Trusts Based upon the Breach of an Express Oral
Trust of Land," 2o Harv. L. Rev. 549 (1927); Stone, "Resulting Trusts
and the Statute of Frauds," 6 Col. L. Rev. 3z6 (19o6); Costigan, "Trusts
Bacd on Oral Promises to Hold in Trust, to Convey, or to Devise, Made by
Voluntary Grantees," 12 Mich. L. Rev. 4z3, 515 (1914); Costigan, "Con-
structive Trusts Based upon Promises to Secure Bequests, Devises or Intestate
Succession," z8 Harv. L. Rev. 237, 366 (1915); Scott, "Conveyances upon
Trusts not Properly Declared," 37 Harv. L. Rev. 653 (1924); McWilliams,
"The Doctrine of Constructive Trusts as Laid Down in Curdy v. Breton,"
16 Cal. L. Rev. 19 (1927).
47 See 3 Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra, sec. 496.
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where they would have been had the wrong not been com-
mitted. 8 If, however, B was in good faith when he orally
promised to hold fur C but subsequently breached his agree-
ment there is a sharp conflict on the question whether the statute
prevents a trust in C's favor. One view is that the statute of
frauds prevents the court of equity going forward with the oral
promise to establish a constructive trust for C, but that the trust
should be imposed for the grantor or his estate. ' The second
view considers that the oral promise created in C an equitable
interest and since B's breach prevented his receiving it that C
is thereby defrauded and the constructive trust should be im-
posed for him.5" A considerable group of cases favors this
view.
5 1
A similar situation is presented where a testator made his
will devising property to B upon his oral promise to give the
property to C. If the devise was secured by actual fraud, duress
or undue influence, the court of equity will impose a trust upon
B for the benefit of C although the will is an absolute devise
and B's promise was oral and in no sense executed in accordance
with the will's act. C is the defrauded person at whose expense
B was unjustly enriched.52  The existence at the time of the
promise of an intention not to carry out the promise is a fraud
on C because it prevented effective action on the testator's part
to carry out his purpose with respect to C. 3 It is believed that
4 8Huffine v. Lincoln, 57 Mont. 585, I6o Pac. 82o (1916); McDonald
v. Tyner, 84 Ark. 189, 105 S.W. 74 (1907); McKinney v. Burns, 3i Ga.
295 (186o); Stout v. Stout, 165 Ia. 552, 146 N.W. 474 (1914); Reardon v.
Reardon, 219 Mass. 594, 107 N.E. 5zz (114). See 3 Bogert, op. cit., note
3, supra, sec. 495, notes 34 and 35 for long list of cases.
" Scott, op. cit., note 46, supra; Ames, op. cit., note 46, supra.
50 Costigan, op. cit., note 46, supra.
" Becker v. Newrath, 149 Ky. 421, 149 S.W. 857 (191z); Androscog-
gin Co. v. Tracy, 115 Me. 433, 99 Ad. 257 (1916); Huffine v. Lincoln,
note 47, supra.
52 Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 52o, 81 N.E. 248 (907); Arnston. v.
First National Bank, 39 N.D. 408, 167 N.W. 760, L.R.A. 1918 Fed. 1038
(1918) ; 3 Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra, p. 1616. But see dictum, contra,
Kent v. McHaffey, 1o Ohio St. 204 (1859).
"Dowd v. Tucker, 41 Conn. 197 (1874); Baron v. Stuart, 136 Ark.
481, 207 S.W. 22 (1918); Am. Law Inst., op. cit., note 59, post, sec. i86.
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the Ohio court might accept this view."4 The same result should
be reached where by actual fraud, testacy is secured, the testator
being prevented by the promise of the devisee therein to hold
for C from revoking his will or where intestacy is secured by an
heir on his oral promise to give the property inherited to a third
person, C. In both of these situations, however, our supreme
court has declared against any constructive trust for C. In the
case of Kent v. M'iahaffey," a blind testator was prevented, by
the deception of an interested person, from burning his will,
and on the death of the testator it was probated. The court held
that none of the statutory methods of revocation had been
satisfied, and declared that "it would be of little purpose to
prescribe formalities for the making and authentication of wills
if persons interested in setting the same aside, were permitted
to do so by parol proof of an intention to revoke." In support
of this main thesis, that equity could not impose a trust upon
the devisee or legatees for those who would have taken by
descent or succession had the will been revoked, the court
strongly denies the other case, also by dictum, of course. The
opinion states, "If one who fraudulently prevents the revoca-
tion of a will, may be treated as a trustee for the heir at law,
it would seem to follow, by a parity of reasoning, that where an
heir at law, by force or fraud, prevents the execution of a will,
he should also be held as a trustee for the intended beneficiary
of the unexecuted will. No lawyer would, I think, hazard the
opinion, that the heir at law could, in any such case, be declared
a trustee." As pointed out by Olney, J., of the case of Brazil v.
Silva," this is precisely what Lord Thurlow had done years
before," and it has received the approval of Lord Eldon, 8
and of many writers and judges since."5 With attention fixed
"' IWinder v. Scholey, 83 Ohio St. 204, 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 995, 93 N.E.
1o98, zi Ann. Cas. 1379 (1910).
Kent v. Mrahaffey, note 52, supra.
Brazil v. Silva, 181 Cal. 490, 496, 185 Pac. 174 (1919).
1 Dixon v. Olinius, I Cox 414, 29 Eng. Rep. 1227 (1787).
5 Mestover v. Gillestie, i i Ves. 638, 32 Eng. Rep. 1230 (1805).
r1 Scott, op. cit., note 46, supra, p. 671 ; Bogert, op. cit., note 3, supra,
p. x616; Brazil v. Silva, note 56, supra; Bulkley v. Wilford, 2 Clark & Finn,
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upon the statute of wills, or the statute of revocation of wills,
the Supreme Court of Ohio has wholly neglected the remedial
possibilities of the constructive trust and in yet another in-
stance permitted fraudulent acts to go unredressed. In In re
O'Hara,"0 Finch, J., of the New York Court of Appeals strong-
ly stated the position contended for in this paper as follows:
"Equity acts, in such case, not because of a trust declared by the
testator, but because of the fraud of the legatee. For him not
to carry out the promise by which he secured the devise and be-
quest is to perpetrate a fraud upon the devisor which equity
will not endure.- - - All along the line of discussion it was
steadily claimed that a plain and unambiguous devise in a
will could not be modified or cut down by extrinsic matters
lying in parol or unattested papers, and that the statute of
frauds and that of wills excluded the evidence; and all along
the line it was steadily answered that the devise was untouched;
that it was not at all modified; that the property passed under
it but the law dealt with the holder for his fraud and out of the
facts raised a trust ex maleficio instead of resting upon one as
created by the testator." '' (Italics mine). Judge Olney6 con-
cluded that "Kent v. Mahaffey, . . . proceeded upon a failure
to recognize and appreciate a fundamental principle of equity
jurisprudence, and one, as we have said, characteristic of the
peculiar province of equity. We hardly need point out that
equity does not in such a case grant relief simply because there
has been an abortive attempt to comply with the statute .... It
grants relief only in case and because of a wrong done by the
defendant of which he seeks to reap the fruit." It is submitted
that the existence of a diabolical fraudulent intent and act on
boz, 6 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1834); Irnre Stirk'sEst., 232 Pa. 98, 81 At. 187
(1911); Bennett v. Harper, 36 W. Va. 546, i5 S.E. 143 (189z). See
American Law Institute, R.S. of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, Proposed
Final Draft, sec. 184, i85 (1936).
60 95 N.Y. 403, 47 Am. Rep. 53 (1884).
"'Amherst College v. Retch, x5i N.Y. 282 (1897) dictum; Blackwell
v. Blackwell, A.C. 318 (1929); Gilpatrick v. Glidden, 81 Me. 137 (I888).
"3 Brazil v. Sylvia, note 56, supra.
THE CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST IN OHIO 17
the part of the devisee, whereby he secures testacy, or prevents
revocation of a will and thereby acquires the property intended
for another or such conduct on the part of an heir who induces
his ancestor to die intestate on his promise to give the property
inherited to one intended is sufficient and indeed precisely the
sort of case to call forth from the chancellor his most effective
remedial device-the constructive trust.
When we turn from cases of actual fraud to another class of
will cases, wherein at the time the devisee promised the testator
that he would hold the property for another, he fully intending
to do so, and there was no actual fraud, and after the death of
the testator, and the probate of the will, the legatee decided not
to carry out his promise, one is surprised to find in the case of
Winder v. Scholey,"2 one of the strongest cases favoring and
applying the constructive trust remedy, quite refreshingly out
of line with the Ohio cases previously noted. Counsel for the
defendant in this case was probably right in his contention that
"there was no reported case in Ohio, in which a trust has been
engrafted on a will by parol." To reach this result the court
had to decide, as it did, that a subsequent breach of a promise
is fraud just as much as the existence of an intent not to abide
by the promise when it was made. There is strong objection
to this position." It is going quite far to decide that a breach
of a promise or agreement constitutes fraudulent conduct. This
position is a striking contrast to that announced by Johnson,
C. J., in Watson v. Erb,4 when he said, "The fraud which will
give jurisdiction to compel a performance of the parol trust,
must consist in something more than a mere breach of parol
undertaking." Furthermore, the court must decide as it did,
that the statute of wills did not preclude the raising of the con-
structive trust for the intended person though certainly the
parol promise did not comply with the wills act. Had there
been a statute of frauds applicable to the creation of trusts in
02 Note 54, supra.
, Scott, op. cit., note 46, supra, p. 67 1.
6 33 Ohio St. 35 (1877).
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this state, from the tone of this opinion, one is inclined to con-
clude that it would not have altered the result. In short,
Winder v. Scholey, is one of the strongest cases favorable to the
imposition of the constructive trust. The authorities for this
view are numerous."' The court in its opinion gives full sup-
port to the thesis of this paper. Summers, C. J., quoted at
great length from Finch's, J. opinion in the O'Hara case, but no
mention is made of Kent v. Mahaffey, or the statement above
quoted from Watson v. Erb.
ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY A MURDERER
A troublesome question often produces conflicting decisions
and theories. This has happened in the several fact patterns
in which a beneficiary murders his benefactor, thereby hastening
the acquisition of the property. Had the remedial character-
istic of the constructive trust been understood it seems incred-
ible that it should not have been more generally utilized for it
furnishes precisely the effective remedy needed. The following
are the situations in which the problem most frequently arises;
an heir murders his ancestor, a legatee or devisee murders his
testator, a joint depositor, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety
murders his co-owner, a remainderman murders the interven-
ing life tenant, and the beneficiary in a policy of life insurance
murders the insured.
In their attempts to give justice in the above cases the courts
have developed three theories, two of which are conceived to be
wrong. There seems to be general agreement that a strong
public policy exists against allowing a murderer to enjoy the
benefits of the property formerly owned or made available by
o5 Scott, op. cit., note 46, supra, p. 671 n. 57; Bogert, op. cit., note 3,
supra, sec. 498; 66 A.L.R. 156; American Law Institute, Restatement, Trusts,
sec. 55 (1) "Where a testator devises or bequeaths property to a person in
reliance upon his agreement to hold the property in trust, the devisee or
legatee holds the property upon a constructive trust for the person for whom
he agreed to hold it. (2) When a person dies intestate in reliance upon an
agreement by his heir or next of kin to hold the property which he acquires by
such intestacy upon a trust, the heir or next of kin holds the property upon a
constructive trust for the person for whom he agreed to hold it."
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his victim."' Even those courts, which decide that under the
law they cannot avoid the result, often express regret. By the
first theory it is concluded that the wrongdoer cannot profit by
his wrong and therefore he does not take legal or equitable title
to the property by descent or by the will, and, in the insurance
cases, that he cannot enforce the policyY Since the statutes of
descent, unless recently amended, quite generally do not make
any exception to the descent of property on the death of the
owner, and the wills act fails to exclude the devisee or legatee,
who inconsiderately hastens the death of the testator, it seems
clear that by the law of descent and of wills that the murderer
does succeed to the title to the property. In Riggs v. Palmer,"8
which is the leading case supporting the first view, the court
found it necessary to legislate an exception into the succession
statute. Judicial legislation is avoided where possible, and the
court was hardly justified, in its technique of "statutory con-
struction," in deciding that they must read into the positive
enactment of the statute only that connotation which reason-
able men, men like themselves, would accept, and exclude all
else. Hence, the court held that the statute did not mean that
in all cases property would descend as provided, but only in
all reasonable cases, and it was not a reasonable case for a mur-
""' Cleaver v. Mutual Life Fund Assoc., I Q.B. 147 (1892); Mutual Life
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591, Field J. "It would be a reproach to the
jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on
the death of a per.on whose life he had feloniously taken."
"a Riggs v. Palmer, I15 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188, 5 L.R.A. 340, I2 Am.
St. Rep. 819 (1889). Reversed, Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N.Y. 149, 42 N.E.
540 (1895); Shellenberger v. Ransom, 31 Neb. 61, 47 N.W. 700 (1896).
Reversed, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N.W. 935 (1894); Perry v. Strawbridge, 209
Mo. 6zi, io8 S.W. 64I (1907); Wall v. Pfauschmidt, 265 II. I8o, lo6
N.E. 785 (1914); Box v. Lanier, I12 Tenn. 393, 79 S.W. 1042 (1903);
In re Santourian, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N.Y.S. i16 (925); In re Tyler's
Est. 140 Wash. 679, 250 Pac. 456 (I926); Est. of Wilkins, 192 Wis. iii,
2I N.W. 65z (1927) ; Garwols v. Banker's Trust Co., 251 Mich. 42o, 232
N.W. 239 (1930); Slocum v. Met. Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E.
816 (1923) ; De Zotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6o S.D. 532, 245 N.W. 58
(1932).
" Note 67, supra.
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derer to succeed to his victim's property. The Judge in Deems
v. Milliken, 9 quite convincingly answers this argument.
In the insurance cases there is no statutory necessity for de-
ciding that the property in the policy passed to the murderer.
When, therefore, the beneficiary sues on a policy the courts
can, and quite generally do, hold that he has no rights under
the policy, that he has sacrificed them by his wrongdoing."0
Apparently, it is not essential to prove that the killing was done
with the purpose of hastening enjoyment by the beneficiary.
It is enough to allege and prove the murder.7 The policy,
however, is not rendered void and the insurance company ex-
cused from liability thereunder in the absence of an express
stipulation so providing. 2 A clause in the policy excluding the
beneficiary who thus hastens the maturity thereof from any
rights therein does not affect the rights of the children of the
insured, or his estate.73 It has been held that the beneficiary-
murderer might, however, participate in the benefits of the
policy as a distributee of the insured's estate."'
A second theory, adopted by the Ohio courts,"5 and by the
09 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (1892).
70 Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 8z Ohio St. 208, 92 N.E. z,
28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 675, 137 Am. St. Rep. 778 (1910); Polish v. National
Alliance Co. v. Crowley, 38 Ohio App. 327, 176 N.E. 49z (1930); National
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Davi, 38 Ohio App. 454, 176 N.E. 490, 30 Ohio
L. Rep. 270 (1979); Cook's Adm. v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 30 Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) z47 (1932). (Recent statute later discussed.) See cases collected and
annotated in 7 A.L.R. 828, 27 A.L.R. 521, 70 A.L.R. 1539, 91 A.L.R.
1486; Am. Law Institute, Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrich-
ment (P.F.D.) Sec. 189 and comments (1936).
7' Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., note 70, supra.7 2 A.L.R. notes. Note 70, supra.
73 Polish National Alliance Co. v. Crowley, note 70, supra.
'4 National Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Davis, note 70, supra. Contra,
DeLotell v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., note 67, supra. ("It seems fair and reason-
able to treat the matter, so far as concerns the insurer, substantially as though
the named beneficiary had died prior to the death of the insured and no
successor had been designed." It was thought "absurd" to permit the mur-
derer to share.). Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., i io N.J.L. 414, 166 Ad. 335
(1933). Am. Law Institute, note 70, supra, sec. 189.7 5Deems v. Milliken, 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (892) (affd. without opinion)
53 Ohio St. 668 (1895) (Descent); Hodapp v. Oleff, 17 Ohio Abs. 0934).
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majority of states,' although recently modified by statute,77 rec-
ognizes that the legislature has made no exception in the descent
and will statutes and refuses power in the courts to inject ex-
ceptions by judicial legislation, and thus the murderer inherits
the land, takes by devise, by survivorship, and shares in the
proceeds of an insurance policy as distributee of the estate.
Many courts seem to consider that this view is compelled by the
constitutional provisions against forfeitures and corruption of
blood,7" quite overlooking the vast difference in the purpose
of this plank in the bill of rights and the cases involved before
them. Moreover, no instance has been discovered of the use
of this constitutional provision to prevent restitution of prop-
erty obtained by fraud or theft."a
S-e comment 7 Ohio Bar 66I, 543, Aff. Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St.
432 (1935). National Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, not 70 supra.
7, Hagan v. Cone, a' Ga. Auu. 416, 94 S.E. 6oz (1917); Wall v. Pfau-
schmidt, 265 Il. i8o, io6 N.E. 785, L.R.A. 1915 C. 328, Ann. Cas. 1916 A.
674 (1914); Kuhn v. Kuhn, 125 Ia. 449, io N.W. 15I, 2 Ann. Cas. 657
(1904); Estate of Emerson, i9i Ia. 9oo, 183 N.W. 327 (1921); McAllister
v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 Pac. I1Z, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 726, 115 Am. St. Rep.
233, 7 Ann. Cas. 973 (i906) ; Eversole v. Eversole, 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W.
487, L.R.A. i916 E 593 (i916); IVellnerv. Eckstein, IO5 Minn. 444, 117
N.W. 830 (19o8); Gollinck v. Mengel, 112 Minn. 349, 128 N.W. 292
(i91o); Schellenberger v. Ransom, note 67 supra; Wilson v. Randolph, 50
Nev. 371, z6I Pac. 654 (1927); Owens v. Owens, ioo N.C. 240, 6 S.E.
794 (1888); Johnson's Estate, 29 Pa. Super. 255 (1905); Carpenter's Estate,
170 Pa. 203, 3 z Ad. 637, z9 L.R.A. 145, 50 Am. St. Rep. 765 (1895);
Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. z88 (Tex. 191a); Murchison v. Murchison, 203
S.W. 423 (Tex. 1918).
77 Note 80 post.
73 Ohio Constitution, Art. VII, sec. i6 "No conviction shall work corrup-
tion of blood or forfeiture of estate." The court in Deems v. Milliken, note
69 supra, indicated that the section was not applicable. This position is ap-
proved by the Am. Law Institute, op. cit. note 70 supra, sec. 187, comment C.
("Even in state in which the rules stated in this section are rejected, statutes
which provide that a murderer shall not inherit property from his victim are
not unconstitutional.") The majority of the Ohio Supreme Court, however,
recently seemed to consider this constitutional provision an obstacle. Oleff v.
Hodapp, note 75 post. ("We have no power to attaint Tego in any way,
shape, or form.") See further cases note 77, supra. See Costigan, 7 IIl., L.
Rev. 505 (1915).
7Luttrell v. Olinius, ii Ves. 638, 14 Ves. 290 (1807); Hausen v.
Hausen, i Io Wash. 276, I88 Pac. 46o (1920); Fox v. Hubbard, 79 Mo.
390 (1883); Nebraska Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 51 Neb. 546, 71 N.W. 294
(1897).
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So shocking a result has led to legislative modifications of
the descent statutes. The provision in Ohio 0 is "No person
finally adjudged guilty, either as principal or accessory, of mur-
der in the first or second degree, shall be entitled to inherit or
take any part of the real or personal estate of the person killed,
whether under the provisions of this act relating to intestate
succession, or as devisee or legatee or otherwise under the will
of such person, nor shall such person inherit or take any real or
personal estate of any other person as to which such homicide
terminated an intermediate estate, or hastened the time of en-
joyment. With respect to inheritance from or participation
under the will of the person killed, the person so finally ad-
judged guilty of murder in the first or second degree shall be
considered as though he had preceded in death the person
killed." The statute of Ohio, it will be observed, prevents the
murderer from succeeding to the property of the victim in case
of conviction of first or second degree murder. If the murderer
should commit suicide before his conviction,"' or if he were con-
victed in a foreign state of being the "moral author of the
crime," a conviction not within the terms of the statute," or his
s" Ohio G.C. 10503-17. "Statutes in conformity with this view have
been passed in at least 23 jurisdictions," 29 Mich. L. Rev. 745 at 749 (1931),
citing following: Cal. Civ. Code 1923, sec. 1409; Colo. Sess. Laws 1923 C
195; Ind. Ann. Stat. 1926, sec. 3376; Iowa Code 1927, sec. 12032-4; Kan.
Rev. St. 8923, sec. 22-133; La. Rev. Civil Code, 8924, sec. 966, 156o
,
1710; Minn. Mason's Stat. 1927, sec. 8734; Miss. Code 1927, sec. 3580;
Neb. Comp. Stat. 8922, sec. 1238; N.C. Cons. Stat. i19, sec. 10, 4099;
N.D. Comp. Laws 1913, sec. 5683; Okla. Comp. Stat. 192i, sec. 11319; Pa.
Stat. 192o, sec. 8334; S.C. Laws 1924, No. 726; Tenn. Shannon's Code
1917, sec. 417ia; Utah Comp. Laws 1917 sec. 6403; Va. Code 1924 sec.
5274; Wyoming Comp. Stat. 1920, sec. 70o. To this list four more states
must be added (932). Ohio G.C. 10503-17; Ark. Dig. St. 8927, 3584
a & b; Florida, Comp. Gen. Laws Ann. (1934) sec. 5480; Ore. Code Ann.
(1930) C. 10 sec. 213; W. Va. Code Ann. (Michie 1932) C. 42, art. 4,
sec. 2. See 44 Yale L.J. 164.
"In re Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa. 328, 172 Ad. 139 (1934).
" Hodapp v. Oleff, note 75, supra; Oleff v. Hodapp, note 75, supra. See
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 115 W. Va. 515, 177 S.E. 188 (A wife
who had killed her husband whose life was insured, was convicted of involun-
tary manslaughter. The statute excluded from the succession law a "feloneous"
killer, which the wife was not. Held common law rule obtained and descent
not changed.) See comment 41 W. Va. L. Rev. 287 (8935).
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conviction was not of first or second degree murder the statute
would not prevent the killer from taking, and would seemingly
fall short of accomplishing the thoroughgoing change needed in
the law. Similarly, since this statute is probably penal in char-
acter it would have no extraterritorial effect." It seems obvious
that the second theory produces an undesirable result and that
the attempted statutory corrections are at best very inadequate.
It is submitted that the courts in announcing this theory, in the
first instance, have had their thought fixedly centered on the
statutes involved and have apparently considered that to decree
that the murderer, after the property comes to him, could be
deprived thereof would be doing violence to the statute of de-
scent. Had they imposed a constructive trust upon him, in such
cases as justice required, there would have been no need for the
legislature to attempt to meet the problem by a general excep-
tion statute. Furthermore, the equitable remedial device of
constructive trust has the distinct advantage over the statute in
that it is a flexible remedy in the hands of the chancellor usable
as and if the exigencies of the particular case may require in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion.
Years ago Dean Ames urged the splendid efficacy of the
constructive trust to meet the difficulty and this solution has
met with the unanimous approval of law writers84 but the courts
have shown surprising reluctance to apply that remedy to the
facts under consideration. Recently, however, this view has
,' Harrisoaz v. Moncravia, 264 Fed. 776 (i92O).
,4 Ames, "Can a Murderer Acquire Title by His Crime and Keep It?"
36 Am. L. Reg. (N.S. 225) (1897). Lectures on Legal History, 310 (913).
Bogert, Trusts, izo (192). Clark, Equity, p. 293 (1919). 3 Pomeroy, Eq.
Jur. sec. io44. Bordwell, "Statute Law of Wills, 14 Ia. L.R. 304 (1928).
Comments: 9 Ii. L. Rev. 505 (1915); 7 Mich. L. Rev. 16o (1908); 3
L.R.A. (N.S.) 726; 39 id. 1O89; L.R.A. 1915 C. 328. See 51 A.L.R. lO96
(927); 71 A.L.R. 288 (1931); 4 Harv. L. Rev. 394- (1891), 8 id. 170(1894); 24 id. 227 (0914); 27 id. 28o (0914); 30 id. 672 01917); 44
Harv. L. Rev. 125 (1 9 29 ); 4 Mich. L. Rev. 653 (i9O6); 7 id. 71 (1908);
13 id. 336 (915); I6 id. 561 (1918); 29 id. 745 (1931); 64 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 307 (1916); 27 Yale L.J. 964 (1918); 44 id. 164 (934); 8 N.Y.
U.L.Q. Rev. 492 (1930); 5 N.C.L. Rev. 373; 3 L.Q. Rev. 411; 70. Bas.
Rep. 661. Cardozo, "The Nature of the Judicial Process," 40-42 (1921).
Am. Law Inst. op. cit. note 70 supra, sec. 187, I88, 189.
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been meeting a more favorable reception by the courts.8" The
theory assumes that the murderer does succeed to the property
either by descent, by devise, by survivorship, or by termination
of the intervening life estate, and, in the insurance cases, by
distribution of victim's estate. But equity has power and ought
to determine whether the murderer, having become the absolute
owner of the property, shall because of his wrongdoing and his
consequent unjust enrichment, be permitted to keep it. In
Hodapp v. Oleff, 0 Sherick, J., after holding that the co-deposi-
tor in a joint account should take and keep a joint deposit de-
dared, "It is not the pleasure of this court to have reached the
conclusion arrived at," and Stephenson, J., in affirming the
case, Oleff v. Hodapp" said: "We experience no satisfaction
in holding that Tego is entitled to this account; but that is the
law and we must so find." It is interesting to discover the fol-
lowing explanation by the learned judge of the reason he was
forced to this unhappy position, - "We have heretofore stated
that there is no statutory law in Ohio that deprives Tego of his
right to this account. Counsel insist that Tego's right should
be denied him because to allow it would be in contravention of
sound public policy and place a premium on murder. We are
not subscribing to the righteousness of Tego's legal status; but
this is a court of law and not a theological institution. We have
no power to attaint Tego in any way, shape, or form. Property
cannot be taken from an individual who is legally entitled to
it because he violates a public policy. Property rights are too
sacred to be subjected to a danger of that character."
The following from Williams', J., dissenting opinion places
the matter in sharp contrast. After quoting Cardozo's defini-
tion of a constructive trust, he said: "It is the modern device
resorted to in equity to prevent the murderer from profiting by
his own crime, though acquiring an interest in property by his
85 Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Barnett r.
Coney, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W. (2d) 757 (1930); Hall v. Knight, 135
L.T.J. 550 (1913).
86 Note 75, sutra.
8 7 Note 75, suPra.
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victim's death." To declare the murderer-owner of the prop-
erty a constructive trustee does no violence to the statute of
descent, the wills act, the law of survivorship in joint owner-
ship, or the law of distribution; nor, it is believed, to the sacred-
ness of property. Those laws have performed their function
and now equity simply declares that from this point forward the
owner shall hold for another. It is decreeing a constructive
trust and thereby establishing the rights of a cestui que trust on
the one best entitled. This conclusion finds support in the Pro-
posed Final Draft of the Restatement of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment," "Unless it is otherwise provided by statute, a de-
visee or legatee or heir or next of kin who murders his testator
or intestate, acquires the legal title to the property by testate or
intestate succession, but he will be compelled to hold it upon a
constructive trust. By a proceeding in equity he will be com-
pelled to surrender the property to the persons who are equit-
ably entitled to it." No idea of punishment of the murderer,
or the working of a corruption of blood, contrary to the consti-
tution, exists at all.
An objection might be urged that since this remedial device
is operative to prevent a person who fraudulently obtains prop-
erty from enjoying the beneficial interest that it should be
limited to the cases in which the murderer was motivated by
the property interest and that it was inapplicable to cases of
immediate suicide or where the crime was committed for other
reasons."s The constructive trust is designed to prevent unjust
enrichment and the murderer will be so enriched even though
he has been punished for the crime which he committed with
no thought of property in mind. There is no satisfactory reason
here for refusing the equitable relief."
' Sec. 187 comment d.
"Costigan, 9 IlI. L. Rev. 505 at 507 (1915); 3o Harv. L. Rev. 6zz
(1917).
" Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N.C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927) (Crime com-
mitted with property motive); VanAlstyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169
N.Y.S. 173 (1918) (id.) See contra overruled case, In re Wolf, 88 Misc.
433, i5o N.Y.S. 738 (1914); Shermanv. Weber, 113 N.J.E. 451, 167 Ad.517 (1933).
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There being then strong reasons for declaring the construc-
tive trust, for whom shall it be declared? In the answer to this
question the virtue of the flexible quality of the remedy herein
contended for is apparent. The chancellor is governed not by
rule but is free to choose the one best entitled, considering al-
ways the facts of the particular case. Where the heir murders
his ancestor the court will probably select the second heir, that
is, the person who would have inherited from the victim had
the murderer predeceased him.91 The predisposition of the
courts to keep estates in families and under private ownership
would preclude naming charities, or the state, as cestui que
trust. The statutes of descent would doubtless be of consider-
able aid. A somewhat easier selection is presented where the
devisee murders the testator. A residuary devise is the first and
most obvious solution. If the will carries no residuary clause
the court would likely prefer the heir and after him resort to
the statute of descent.92 The same solution would seem obvious
for the disposition of the insurance money received by the mur-
derer as distributee of the victim's estate, 3 while the joint
ownership cases would likely be resolved in a way not very
different from that adopted in the descent-devise cases.9"
Where one joint owner kills the other and the doctrine of
survivorship thus places the entire property in the murderer
and the court declares him constructive trustee for a cestui que
trust there is some controversy in cases where the murderer's
existing interest is enlarged with respect to the extent of the
trust declared. It would seem that the murderer by his act had
deprived his co-owner of the possibility of surviving him.
Logically, therefore, a constructive trust should extend to and
include the entire property. It is no longer jointly owned. It
has been held, however, in a case in which the husband killed
his wife and immediately committed suicide that the tenancy by
91 Am. Law Inst. op. cit. note 70, supra, sec. 187 (2).
92 Costigan, note 89, supra.
" Am. Law Inst. op. cit. note 70, supra, sec. 189.
4 Am. Law Inst. op. cit. note 70, supra, sec. i88. See Costigan, op. cit.
note 78, supra, also, 30 Harv. L.Rev. 6z2 (915).
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entirety ceased and tenancy in common arose in a joint bank
account, and the murderer was constructive trustee of only
half."5 In another case of tenancy by entirety the court imposed
a constructive trust only for the wife's interest. The court felt
bound to preserve in the husband his own interest."' It has often
been thought proper to resort to the mortality tables to deter-
mine the life expectancies of the joint owners presumably to
discover if the murderer really deprived the victim of any-
thing. Mortality tables will give averages, but it is believed
that no one claims for them a prophecy of life for an individual.
Such use seems unwarranted." All that equity should require
is proof of the facts in the case and having found that the
murderer by survivorship is now the owner, declare a trust in
all the property against him," saving to him only his rights
during his life. The most that can be said, in the event his ex-
pectancy was greater than that of his victim, is that by his
wrongful act he has made a probability into a certainty in his
own favor. But for his wrongful act his victim might have
outlived him. Likewise, as stated by Judge Williams, in the
joint account case," "To allow the nephew's guardian to recover
would be to allow him to gain something he did not have before
his uncle's death. Before the act of homicide the nephew had
a relative right to the deposit. If he did not withdraw it before
the uncle did, he had no right therein.... The nephew killed
his uncle and made it impossible for the uncle to withdraw the
deposit and the nephew now claims his right to withdraw it
was made exclusive and absolute in him by his uncle's murder."
It is submitted that the constructive trust, a remedy in the
,5 Barnett v. Coney, note 85, supra, approved in 29 Mich. L.Rev. 745
at 75 z . But see 44 Harv. L. Rev. 125.
.,G Bryant v. Bryant, note 9o, supra. See criticism 5 N.C.L. Rev. 373
(1927).
" See 44 Harv. L. Rev. 125 (Rather full consideration of problem.)
Shermai zv. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 451 (1933).
" Beddingfield v. Estill & Newman, ii8 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 1o8
(1907). Contra, Sherman v. Weber, 113 N.J. Eq. 45 1, 167 Ad. 5 17 (193 3);
30 Harv. L. Rev. 622 at 625.
'" Oleff v. Hodapp, note 75, supra.
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arsenal of equity, which like all remedies, accepts the situation
as it finds it and works out the justice and the equity of that
situation, always flexible, within the control and discretion of
the chancellor, is by far the most satisfactory solution of this
vexing problem. It avoids all statutory lapses and gaps and
is remarkably effective in achieving complete justice.
ORAL AGENCIES To Buy LAND
The Statute of Frauds provides that no action shall be
brought to charge the defendant upon any contract concerning
an interest in land unless the agreement upon which the action
is brought or some note or memorandum thereof shall be in
writing. If P, the principal, desires to purchase a tract of land
from the owner through an agent, A, and orally agrees with
A that the latter shall purchase said land for him, he, P, to
furnish the money, and A decides to purchase for himself and
does so with his own money, without informing P, or terminat-
ing the agency, and A refuses either to accept P's money or
convey the land to him, a problem of fraud and the statute of
frauds." Had the oral agreement been that A would purchase
For the most part the Ohio courts have again taken the more
conservative view, at least with respect to the use of the con-
structive trust remedy."' This conservative view, in the first
place, considers such an agency contract as one concerning a
conveyance of an interest in lands and thus one which should
not afford a basis for any action either at law or in equity, be-
10042 A.L.R. io at 28, 54 A.L.R. 1195; Watson v. Erb, 33 Ohio St.
35 (dictum); Newman v. Taylor, 32 Ohio St. 399, 409 (dictum); Newman
v. Newman, 103 Ohio St. 230 (1921). But see, Topper Bros. v. Bohn, iz
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 177 (1911); James v. Smith, I Ch. 384; Bibb v. Hunter,
79 Ala. 351 (1885); Mitchell v. Wright, 155 Ala. 458, 46 So. 473 (1908);
Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Ia. 125, 14 Am. Rep. 505 (1872); Day v. Amburgey,
147 Ky. 123, 143 S.W. 1033 (1912); Fischlis v. Dumaresly, 3 A.K. Marsh
(Ky.) 23 (I920); Kimmons v. Barnes, 205 Ky. 502 (1924); Dougan v.
Bennis, 95 Minn. 22o, 103 N.W. 882, 5 Ann. Cas. 253 (905); Farnham v.
Clements, 51 Me. 426 (1863); Emersonv. Galloupe, 158 Mass. 146 (1893);
Cann v. Berry, i99 N.E. 905 (Mass. 1936); dictum; Cushing v. Heustont, 53
Wash. 379, 1O2 Pac. 29 (1909); Bogert, op. cit. note 3, supra, sec. 487; 1
Perry, Trusts, sec. 135 (1929).
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cause of the fourth section of the statute of frauds. Not in-
frequently the courts in denying relief rely upon Sugden,"'0
where he declares that under the circumstances outlined above
the principal "cannot compel the agent to convey the estate to
him, as it would be directly in the teeth of the statute of
frauds". Had the oral agreement been that A would purchase
the land and then convey it to P, there could be no doubt that
the contract is within the statute of frauds."0 2 But if the agree-
ment is as postulated, A is not contracting to do anything with
respect to an interest in land, but to procure another, viz., the
land owner, to do something with the land. It would seem then
that the first assumption that it was a contract within the statute
might be questioned."0 3 In the second place, the courts adopting
this view, assuming the contract to be within the statute must
consider that such conduct on the part of the agent does not
constitute fraud sufficient to warrant an imposition of a con-
structive trust upon him, or, if sufficient, that the constructive
trust may not be imposed because somehow that would be doing
violence to the statute of frauds. Mr. Perry, who supports
this view, says, "the relation of principal and agent depends
upon the agreement existing between them, and the trust in
such a case must arise from the agreement and not from the
transaction, and where a trust arises from an agreement, it is
within the statute of frauds and must be in writing.1' "
In respect to the first proposition the Ohio Supreme Court
took the strongest possible position. Johnson, C. J., said: "If
the case taken as a whole is one of fraud, the verbal promise may
be received in evidence as one of the steps by which the fraud
was accomplished. To deduce the fraud from the contract and
then give effect to the contract on the score of fraud, is reason-
ing in a circle. The fraud which will give jurisdiction to corn-
"'l Vendors & Purchasers, (I 4 th ed. 703).10'2 Watson v. Erb, note ioo, supra (That was probably what the facts were
in this case). Stockton v. Watson, 15 Ohio C.C. N.S. I2 (1912); McDoffald
v. Conway, 254 Mass. 429 (1926).
103 Bogert, op. cit. note 3, supra, p. 1535.
'" Perry, op. cit. note 103, supra, sec. 135
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pel a performance of a parol trust, must consist in something
more than a mere breach of a parol undertaking."'0 5 To sup-
pose that the court of equity is so tender of the statute of frauds
that it should not do violence by declaring the agent a construc-
tive trustee is to forget equity's history. Within a decade of its
passage equity began "doing violence" to the statute of frauds
in a fact pattern which has had almost unbroken following from
that day to this. The doctrine of part performance in specific
performance of contracts to remove the bar of the statute of
frauds speaks eloquently of equity's regard for that statute.
Moreover, it is believed that the part performance doctrine did
disregard the statute, and where it has been put upon a sound
basis it has been the prevention or frustration of fraud. The
court was seeking to prevent the statute, passed to prevent
fraud, from itself becoming a device for fraud. To impose a
constructive trust, as hereinbefore pointed out, does no violence
to the statute, but prevents a person who is guilty of wrong-
doing from retaining the fruits of his wrongful conduct. The
action is prospective, and the court of equity is in no sense
attempting "to compel a performance of an oral trust," but by
its remedial process is defeating the results of fraudulent con-
duct and preventing unjust enrichment.
While there is a conflict, as noted above, an equal, if not
somewhat larger, number of states adopt the view suggested,
and, in not a few instances, courts originally adopting the first
view have reversed their former holdings and now embrace this
second view. 6 These cases reveal a thoroughly different atti-
105 Watson v. Erb, note 100, supra, p. 48.
... Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 148, 3 L.Ed. 181 (191o); Irwin v. Phipps,
93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419, 54 A.L.R. 1193 (1927); Colt v. Clapp, 127 Mas.,
476 (I879). But see Mass. cases contra, note ioo, supra. Vallette v. Tedens,
i22 IlI. 607, 14 N.E. 52, 3 Am. St. Rep. 502 (1887); Nester v. Gross, 66
Minn. 371, 69 N.W. 39 (1896). (Perhaps overruled); Wein v. Dillon, 27
Miss. 494 (1854); Harrier Land Co. v. MacGregor, 169 Ia. 5, 149 N.W.
617 (1914); Nebraska Power Co. v. Koenig, 93 Neb. 68, 139 N.W. 839
(1913); Rogers v. Genung, 76 N.J. Eq. 306 (19o9); Harrop v. Cole, 85
N.J. Eq. 32 (1914), affd. 86 N.J. Eq. 250; Kern v. Smith, 290 Pa. 566,
139 At. 450 (1927); Kruzysko v. Gandynski, 207 Wis. 608, 242 N.W. 186
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tude with respect to the agent's conduct and its effect. There
is no mistaking the theory of these decisions. The requirements
of a resulting trust are not sought, as was done in Watson v.
Erb. For example, Stevenson, V. C., said: "A trust which is
more correctly classified as a constructive trust-than as a
resulting trust-is established by proof of the betrayal of
confidence, of the violation of duties arising out of a fiduciary
relation. The fiduciary relation may be established in a num-
ber of ways. It is a mere accident that in this particular case,
and in a large number of others, the fiduciary relation grows
out of a verbal promise. As the authorities abundantly show,
equity will not tolerate the betrayal of confidence and it makes
no difference how this confidence has been obtained .... The
agency may be established by a written contract or a verbal con-
tract, or no formal contract whatever. . . .""' The controlling
question is whether the agent in violation of his agreement with
his principal in the abuse of the confidence reposed in him by
his principal, can be allowed to retain the fruits of his perfidy.
The constructive trust springs from the transaction not the con-
tract. It was in a somewhat similar agency situation that Car-
dozo, J., gave one of his telling definitions or descriptions of a
constructive trust quoted at the outset.' A fiduciary relation-
ship should be safeguarded by equity, and the fixing of a trus-
(193z) noted, 8 Wis. L. Rev. 90 (1933). The above cases and others are
cited by Prof. Bogert in op. cit. note 3, supra, p. 1534. See other cases 42
A.L.R. 7o at p. 29. Topper Bros. v. Bohn, 1z Ohio N.P. N.S. 177 (191').
(Constructive trust imposed, court does not cite Watson v. Erb.) Browns,
St. Frauds, sec. 96 (1895).
107 Harrop v. Cole, note io6, supra. See Rose v. Hayden, 35 Kan. io6,
at Ix8, io Pac. 554, 57 Am. St. Rep. 145 (1886); Bogert, op. cit. note 3,
supra, p. 1535 approves this line of cases. See Feezer, "Constructive Trusts
in Cases of Agency to Buy Real Estate," 17 Minn. L. Rev. 734 (933);
63 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 580 (1915) ; 79 id. 1155 (1931) ; I Mechem, Agency,
Ies. 1192 et se. (1914); 14 Mich. L. Rev. ,38 (j916); 3 Va. L. Rev. 398
(1916); Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment,
P.F.D. sec. 194 d. (1936). Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 521 at 558 (1936) ". . . it is improper for him to purchase for him-
self individually other property which it is his duty to purchase for the prin-
cipal." See cases cited note 131.
(18 Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., note 2, supra.
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teeship upon the one who seeks to gain advantage by his
wrongful conduct with respect to the property thus acquired is
a policy the extension of which should be persistently urged.
There is strong evidence of a trend in that direction. "'
109See an interesting comment, 13 Minn. L. Rev. 711 (1929); Wil-
liams J. dissenting, Oleff v. Hodapp, note 75, supra.
